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Abstract
The notion that life is meaningful through choosing 
to live well has historically received substantive 
attention in various philosophical circles, notably 
the ancient Greek philosophers Socrates, Plato, and 
Aristotle, and more recently several of the existen-
tialists. In some respects, the idea of choosing to 
live well is a “thematization” of two widely-recog-
nized, independent components of a meaningful li-
fe: happiness and authenticity. I develop this notion 
of choosing to live well by exploring, developing, 
and relating these conceptions of happiness and 
authenticity. By appealing to a very basic account 
of human nature that has found favor among a great 
number of people, I show how happiness and au-
thenticity complement each other as conditions for 
the possibility of living meaningfully.
Key words: Plato, Aristotle, existentialism, ha-
ppiness, authenticity.
Resumen
La noción de que la vida es signifi cativa gracias a 
la elección de vivir bien ha recibido históricamente 
atención sustancial en varios círculos fi losófi cos, 
principalmente entre los antiguos fi lósofos griegos 
Sócrates, Platón y Aristóteles, y más recientemen-
te de varios de los existencialistas. En algunos 
aspectos, la idea de escoger vivir bien es una “te-
matización” de dos componentes independientes, 
ampliamente reconocidos como propios de una 
vida signifi cativa: felicidad y autenticidad. El autor 
desarrolla la noción de escoger vivir bien exploran-
do, desarrollando y relacionando estos conceptos. 
Por medio de la apelación a una explicación muy 
básica de la naturaleza humana, aceptada por gran 
número de personas, se muestra cómo felicidad y 
autenticidad se complementan una con otra como 
condiciones para la posibilidad de vivir signifi ca-
tivamente.
Palabras clave: Platón, Aristóteles, existencia-
lismo, felicidad, autenticidad.
Suppose a respected professional, a trusted friend, 
or a family member approached you and claimed 
that life is a meaningless waste of time. Would 
you think this person was joking? Would you be 
shocked, perhaps indignant? Would you seriously 
doubt this person’s well being? I suspect some of 
us would be inclined to wonder why any reasona-
ble person should think such a thing. Anyone who 
has ever waited in a long line at a grocery store or a 
government offi ce only to be redirected to the back 
of another long line, or anyone who has spent time 
sitting in rush hour traffi c will undoubtedly agree 
that at least some of life is a tremendous waste of 
time. Of course most people accept that life is wor-
th living, but surprisingly few have an easy time 
explaining precisely what makes life meaningful, 
and of those who have ready answers a surprising 
number vehemently disagree about what constitu-
tes a meaningful life. The Greek philosopher He-
raclitus once remarked, “people are deceived about 
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the knowledge of obvious things” (McKirahan, 
1994, p. 117). Could it be that the answer to the 
question of the meaning of life is really something 
quite obvious but we persistently fool ourselves as 
we approach it? 
In this essay I shall discuss how certain basic 
assumptions about the human condition inform a 
conception of a meaningful life that emphasizes the 
choices people make in the activity of living their 
lives. Notice fi rst that I have shifted the question 
from the meaning of life to the meaningfulness of 
life. The distinction is subtle but important: I wish 
to avoid burdensome and restrictive questions like 
“Why are we here?” and “What is the purpose of 
life?” and so forth—typical ways of asking about 
the meaning of life. Undoubtedly these are interes-
ting questions to ask, but formulated as such they 
suggest some natural or divine plan or meaning 
for humans which if humans were clever or pious 
enough, we would be able to raise the curtains of 
ignorance to behold the fi nal Answer. The beauty 
of considering the topic from the vantage of the 
human condition is that it focuses the conversation 
on what is universal and present to all humans, re-
gardless of culture, ethnicity, gender, religion, and 
socio-economic status. I do not wish to preclude 
the possibility that there may be various particular 
ways of living a meaningful life within a general 
conception of what makes life meaningful.
The notion that life becomes meaningful 
through a person’s choosing to live life robustly—
in other words, through choosing to live well—has 
historically received substantive attention in va-
rious philosophical circles, notably the ancient 
Greek philosophers Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle 
and more recently several of the existentialists, all 
of whom have signifi cantly infl uenced my own 
philosophical development. In some respects, the 
idea of choosing to live well is a “thematization” of 
two widely-recognized, independent components 
of a meaningful life: happiness and authenticity. To 
this extent, I doubt anyone would fi nd the general 
view I shall present here surprising or scandalous. 
However, I also doubt that, say, the Aristotelian 
conception of happiness or the existential concep-
tion of authenticity are ones many people would 
fi nd intuitive. My project is to develop this notion 
of choosing to live well by exploring, developing, 
and relating these conceptions of happiness and 
authenticity. By appealing to a very basic account 
of human nature that has found favor among a great 
number of people, I shall show how happiness and 
authenticity complement each other as conditions 
for the possibility of living meaningfully.
Some problems with happiness
Often when I ask my students for a word that they 
think best characterizes a meaningful life they say 
happiness. Clearly happiness is a prime contender 
for making a life worth living—after all, is there 
anyone who truly resists the desire to be happy? I 
suspect those who live miserably are people who 
would rather be living happily. Or they seem to live 
miserably but actually fi nd happiness in living what 
appears to others to be an unhappy life, or they are 
simply ignorant of the greater possibilities in life 
for happiness. So, I shall take it, loosely speaking, 
to be axiomatic that all people desire happiness.
But, now the work comes. What do we mean 
by happiness? Responses to this question typi-
cally include pleasure, contentment, satisfaction, 
tranquility, and even giddiness, among others. 
However, there are several reasons for rejecting 
any of these as the sole constituent of a meaningful 
life. The 18th Century philosopher Immanuel Kant 
(1989) seriously questioned whether any of these 
psychological states could claim title to the highest 
good, since one can imagine thoroughly bad people 
experiencing pleasure, contentment, personal satis-
faction, etc. Would we really be comfortable with 
the idea that a thoroughly bad person was in fact 
living a meaningful life simply because he lives a 
pleasant life? I think for similar reasons one should 
be hesitant to think that any of these psychological 
states could be by itself suffi cient for a meaningful 
life. Imagine a person injecting himself regularly 
with enough morphine to sustain a warm euphoria 
but which renders him mostly immobile and inten-
sely passive. 
The contemporary philosopher Robert Nozick 
(1989) has expressed a number of reasons against 
thinking that happiness conceived as pleasure, 
et al, is suffi cient by itself for living a meanin-
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gful life. Typically when we talk about pleasure 
we think of it, implicitly at least, as an internally 
“felt” state that we can quantify. That is, pleasure is 
something that we feel, and we feel pleasure in 
varying degrees, just like we feel pain in varying 
degrees. For example, the pleasure we receive from 
performing well on a test or reading a challenging 
novel is perhaps quantitatively less than drinking 
beer at a baseball game. In fact, the 19th Century 
philosopher John Stuart Mill (2001) argued that 
such examples not only show us that pleasure is felt 
in different degrees but that some pleasures are qua-
litatively better than others. There seem to be quan-
titative and qualitative dimensions to pleasure. 
Nozick (1989) is concerned about this emphasis 
on pleasure in evaluating the meaningfulness of a 
life. First, if it’s only the amount of pleasure that 
mattered in life we could never choose between 
two different lives that contain the exact same 
amount of pleasure in the end, but radically differ 
with regards to when the pleasure emerges. In one, 
a person experiences a constant, gradual increase 
in pleasure through life; in the other a person expe-
riences a constant, gradual decrease. The amount 
of pleasure in both lives would be the same either 
way. But nevertheless we still prefer the former to 
the latter. So, there must be something more to life 
than the amount of pleasure one experiences.
And even if we grant that a life of increasing 
pleasure is the good life, Nozick (1989) argues that 
there is still a problem with pursuing a particular 
mode of life simply for its “felt” qualities. Nozick 
imagines a clever scientist inventing a machine, an 
“experience machine,” that could produce whatever 
experience the person entering the machine prefe-
rred. Should the person want to experience the life 
of a prominent world leader or a microbiologist 
who fi nds a cure for infectious diseases, or even a 
supermodel or rock star, the machine could create 
it in a virtual world. The machine life would feel 
just like the real thing, perhaps even more intense. 
The catch is that the volunteer could never return to 
her original life in the real world and upon entering 
the machine would not remember anything of her 
previous life. 
So, the question is, Would you get into the ma-
chine? Would you encourage your best friends to 
enter the machine? Would you place your child into 
the machine? Of course the point of such thought 
experiments is to get us to realize that there’s some-
thing about the value and meaning of life beyond 
its felt qualities. One’s life in the machine is faked. 
The people one meets aren’t real. The effects of 
your actions are only apparent. Nozick’s (1989) 
conclusion is that there does seem to be something 
to a meaningful life aside from the feelings we get 
from pleasure, satisfaction, tranquility, conten-
tment, etc. What could it be?
Happiness and living well: 
The wisdom of a few ancient Greek 
philosophers
The ancient Greek philosophers had a number of 
int  eresting insights into the nature of happiness, 
and although modern philosophers and scientists 
have debunked much of archaic Greek thought, 
the Greeks’ sundry views on ethics, especially with 
respect to virtue and happiness, remain worthy of 
serious consideration. The ancient Greek word for 
happiness is the mysterious word eudaimonia. Aris-
totle claims that eudaimonia is the highest good 
and the eudaimon life is a pleasurable life, but eu-
daimonia is not the same thing as pleasure, nor do 
we pursue eudaimonia for the sake of pleasure. As 
Aristotle says rather poetically, pleasure completes 
happiness like the “bloom on youths” (Irwin, 1999, 
p. NE 117b33) by which he means that pleasure is 
a good which attends upon our living happily, like 
the attractiveness of youth attends upon youthful-
ness and makes the youth an object of desire. But 
pleasure is not the good.
Aristotle famously proclaims at the beginning of 
the Nicomachean Ethics (Irwin, 1999) that all creati-
ve and constructive arts, intellectual investigations, 
and practical activities such as decision-making 
seem to aim at some good, and he says because of 
that fact people have rightly considered the good to 
be that at which all things aim. Aristotle is compe-
lled to make a case for this claim; he says:
“Suppose, then, that a) there is some end of the 
things we pursue in our actions which we wish for 
because of itself, and because of which we wish 
for other things; and b) we do not choose everything 
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because of something else, since c) if we do, it will 
go on without limit, making desire empty and futile; 
then clearly d) this end will be the good, i.e., the 
best good” (Irwin, 1999, p. 1094a18-22).
Aristotle is appealing to a fairly straightforward 
conception of human motivation. Humans are mo-
tivated by desire for their own good, and our own 
good is the ultimate end of all our actions, whether 
or not we reach it. Here’s the basic intuition that 
Aristotle thinks is right: Suppose you see me stan-
ding on the street corner in the rain. You stop to ask 
me why I am standing in the rain, and I say I want 
to catch the bus uptown. You ask why I want to ride 
the bus uptown, and I respond that I want to get to 
87th Street. You wonder why I should want to do 
that. And I say that I want to visit the art museum 
there. And you, being surprisingly persistent here in 
the rain, ask why I want to visit the museum. As my 
irritation increases, I snap back something about 
wanting to see the Caravaggios. And you ask why 
I want to see the Caravaggio paintings. And so on, 
the questioning proceeds. Eventually, though, so-
mewhere down the line I am simply going to reply 
that I desire to do all of this because of ____. What 
might that fi nal answer be? 
Aristotle claims that the one thing toward which 
all my desires are directed, this fi nal end, this end 
that I choose for the sake of itself and not for the 
sake of anything else, the end that quiets all your 
nagging questions, is happiness. Happiness is the 
ultimate “question stopper.” The reason I desire to 
look at Caravaggios is that ultimately it somehow 
contributes to my overall happiness. Moreover, 
since happiness is the fi nal end and the only fi nal 
end of any action, if there were no possibility of 
happiness, none of my actions would have any po-
int or signifi cance. All my desires would be futile 
without some ultimate goal.
Here is a good place to take stock of the assump-
tions about human nature Aristotle is making. Ob-
viously if humans were not creatures with desires, 
Aristotle would not have much of an argument. 
Desire is certainly an immediately recognizable 
component of our nature. Stones and boards lack 
desires, computers and car engines lack desires, 
but humans obviously have them. Our capacity to 
desire is one characteristic that separates us from all 
these other entities. But, of course, simply having 
the capacity to desire fails to characterize human 
nature completely, since many nonhuman animals 
have desires, too.
Human desire is complicated or enriched, de-
pending on one’s perspective, by another funda-
mental component of human nature which the 
Greeks famously recognized as the single capacity 
that distinguishes humans from the other animals: 
reason. Humans are rational animals. We might 
broaden the sense of “rational” to include the abi-
lity to formulate beliefs, think abstractly, calculate, 
make decisions, conceptualize, introspect, delibe-
rate, theorize, etc. 
Both Plato and Aristotle had a great deal to say 
about the human “psyche” or “soul,” and their un-
derstanding of human nature is inextricably bound to 
their psychology. Outside of religious and perhaps a 
few other contexts, there is not much talk about the 
existence of souls anymore. We locate the source 
of mental activity in the brain and we explain that 
activity in terms of highly intricate electrochemical 
transmissions across complex neural pathways. 
These cerebral events function according to causal 
laws. On the logico-semantic level of explanation, 
we describe the thought processes as proceeding 
according to the rules of logic and syntax and pos-
sessing semantic content, similar to the way we 
describe the operations of computer programs. On 
the contemporary view, the mind is ultimately some 
sort of physical functionality of the brain. Howe-
ver, whether one is a Platonist, an Aristotelian, a 
contemporary philosopher of mind, or a cognitive 
scientist everyone more or less agrees that humans 
are by nature rational creatures with desires. As far 
as questions about a meaningful life are concerned, 
the vocabulary of folk psychology remains inhe-
rently useful. 
Another fundamental component of human natu-
re is that humans are emotional, passionate beings. 
We can experience a wide variety of emotional sta-
tes, ranging from sadness, despair, hatred and anger, 
to joy, amusement, love, and empathy. The ancient 
Greeks were keenly aware of the emotional compo-
nent of human life—there would be no great Greek 
comedy or tragedy without it. Plato goes so far as to 
argue for a distinction between the rational, emotio-
Rev Avances Psicologia_julio_28.indd   33 7/31/08   4:48:07 PM
?Blake E. Hestir
 34?Avances en Psicología Latinoamericana/Bogotá (Colombia)/Vol. 26(1)/pp. 30-42/2008/ISSN1794-4724 
nal, and “appetitive” capacities (Grube, 1992). The 
original argument is lengthy, but the gist is pretty 
clear. Imagine on a hot day while jogging I develop 
an intense thirst for a drink of water. I see a vending 
machine and imagine the pleasure of drinking an 
icy-cold soda, but then think that it would be in my 
best interest to avoid drinking something syrupy and 
sweet on a jog. Whereas my desire pulls me towards 
the soda, I reason that I ought to avoid satisfying my 
desire. Plato concludes that desire must be different 
from reason. 
Plato gives similar arguments for the difference 
between the emotional and appetitive faculties, as 
well as the emotional and rational faculties. For 
example, imagine having the torturous desire to 
smoke cigarettes, yet becoming angry with oneself 
for wanting them. Or imagine a child experiencing 
anger and frustration because she is unable to deter-
mine how to sneak the cookies off the shelf. Young 
children have not yet developed the ability for com-
plex, abstract rational thought; nevertheless, they 
are perfectly able to experience desire and a range 
of emotional states. Human nature then reveals it-
self at the most general level as “tripartite”: humans 
have the distinct capacities to reason, emote, and 
desire. I propose then that we agree with the Greeks 
and take this complex of faculties to be fundamen-
tal to and characteristic of human nature.
Aristotle understands happiness in terms of li-
ving well. This conception differs considerably from 
the “easy answers” like contentment and satisfaction 
I listed earlier, yet understood properly it squares 
better with the above conception of human nature. 
One of the salient features of the ancient Greek 
conception of goodness is that the good as they see 
it must satisfy the condition of being good for the 
individual. Living a happy life is something that is 
psychologically and intellectually benefi cial to us, 
and we achieve such a life by embracing and honing 
the various facets of our nature across time. 
The key to understanding this Aristotelian con-
ception of happiness lies with his view of virtue. 
The Greek word for virtue is aretê. Our contem-
porary use of the word ‘virtue’ remains infused 
with various American pragmatist and Victorian 
Age conceptions, like industriousness and puri-
ty. On the other hand, the Greek sense of aretê is 
something closer to “excellence,” a quality which 
can be shared not only by artifacts and artisans but 
also by humans, and so we might think of aretê as 
a quality or set of qualities that makes something 
an outstanding member of the group to which it 
belongs (Nehamas, 1998).
Aristotle’s interpretation of excellence is inex-
tricably tied to his notion of function. He claims 
that all artifacts, skills, as well as living beings 
have characteristic functions or activities, those 
capacities and characteristics that set them apart 
from other types of thing. For instance, a knife has 
a function, i.e., that capacity or feature it possesses 
insofar as it is a knife and which no other entity has. 
Obviously the function of a knife is to cut. A good 
knife cuts well and a good knife can cut well only 
if its appropriate excellence or virtue is present, 
namely, sharpness. The same holds for occupations 
and skills. For instance, a carpenter’s function is 
to build or assemble things like shelves or houses. 
In order to perform this function well, there is a 
certain set of characteristics the carpenter must 
acquire, and whatever these qualities are would 
be the aretai or “excellences” of carpentry. So, an 
aretê is simply whatever quality or set of qualities 
an entity possesses in order to perform its function 
in the best way possible.
Aristotle claims that humans themselves have a 
characteristic function that he justifi es by appealing 
to his conception of human nature:
Now we take the human function to be a certain kind 
of life, and take this life to be the soul’s activity and ac-
tions that express reason. The excellent man’s function 
is to do this fi nely and well. Each function is completed 
well when its completion expresses the proper virtue. 
Therefore, the human good [i.e., happiness] turns out 
to be the soul’s activity that expresses virtue (Irwin, 
1999, p. 1098a12-17).
Just as with a knife or a carpenter, humans 
insofar as we are rational, thinking, deliberating 
creatures require the presence of a certain set 
of virtues or “excellences” in order to perform 
this function well. So, the association of virtue and 
function amounts more or less to a perfection of our 
human nature. 
Rev Avances Psicologia_julio_28.indd   34 7/31/08   4:48:07 PM
Avances en Psicología Latinoamericana/Bogotá (Colombia)/Vol. 26(1)/pp. 30-42/2008/ISSN1794-4724 ? 35
A few philosophical ruminations on the human condition and choosing to live well ?
Aristotle adds to the above account that happi-
ness is this activity that expresses excellence across a 
complete life, because “one swallow does not make 
a spring, … nor does one day or a short time make 
us happy” (Irwin, 1999, p. 1098a18-19). Since the 
vicissitudes of life can include dramatic swings 
between living well and living poorly, pronoun-
cing on the quality of one’s life would be similar 
to pronouncing on the quality of a book before one 
has fi nished it. Honing our natural human function 
by the complex development of human excellen-
ce places us in the best position to live well. The 
activity of living well over a complete life is what 
Aristotle defi nes as the human good, and that good 
is what he identifi es with happiness. 
Aristotle’s understanding of reason as our cha-
racteristic function is not limited to the abstract ra-
tional thought we associate with doing mathematics 
or physics or philosophical contemplation. Indeed 
a signifi cant portion of our lives is under the direc-
tion of the everyday employment of reason. Reason 
allows us to navigate our way in our daily “goings 
about.” We seek the assistance of reason to size up 
various social situations and environmental con-
texts in light of our emotions and desires, to weigh 
our options, deliberate, communicate, remember, 
choose, and interact. This ability is then sharpened 
by the development of the various virtues; our 
“success” at being human is inextricably tied to 
the development of excellence/virtue (Nehamas, 
1998, p. 77). 
Aristotle divides human excellence into two 
categories. On the one hand, there are the intellec-
tual excellences among which he lists knowledge, 
understanding, and something he calls phronesis 
or practical wisdom. We learn these through edu-
cation and training. On the other hand, there are 
the various moral excellences among which he 
lists courage, moderation, truthfulness (genuine-
ness), and justice. A person acquires the moral 
virtues through practice, similar to the way one 
acquires the ability to play the piano by practicing 
regularly. 
Developing these various excellent states of cha-
racter is diffi cult and time-consuming. Becoming, 
say, a truly moderate person involves trial and error 
and practice at performing moderate acts—in other 
words, we must work at being moderate in order to 
become moderate people. Because I return home 
from school, mix a cocktail, have a sensible dinner, 
and then spend an enjoyable evening reading and 
talking with friends, does not make me a modera-
te person. I could just as easily attend a wedding 
reception the following day and eat and drink well 
beyond my means. So, I practice at performing 
moderate acts, and with time, patience, and effort 
I shall become a moderate person. The intellectual 
virtue of practical wisdom provides us with the 
ability to know our limitations and size up a situa-
tion in order to determine the right amount of, say, 
desire for pleasure, as well as the ability to recog-
nize the appropriate time to express this desire and 
the appropriate objects towards which to express it 
and the right motive with which to express it. So, 
the development of this intellectual excellence is 
essential for the development of moderation and 
the other virtues. Those who do in fact become tho-
roughly excellent humans through the acquisition 
of the various virtues over a lifetime will be in the 
best position to have lived well.
Aristotle’s contention that there is a natural hu-
man function is packaged with his metaphysical 
assumptions about essence and his teleological 
account of natural causality. However, the les-
sons I wish to draw regarding happiness or living 
well do not require one to accept his metaphysical 
worldview. What I fi nd intriguing about Aristotle’s 
conception is the notion of happiness as a special 
sort of activity. Satisfaction, joy, pleasure, and con-
tentment are psychological states in the sense that 
one can be satisfi ed one month and unsatisfi ed the 
next, one can feel joy one day and grief the next. 
Moreover, we could perhaps live pleasurably in 
the experience machine without actually doing an 
y thing. Happiness, on the other hand, involves 
the peculiar activity of expressing the various vir-
tues or “excellences” across a complete life. Hap-
piness is the activity expressing our actual nature 
in the best way. 
One point of agreement between us and Aris-
totle is that humans are biological creatures. Hu-
mans are organic, living things like plants—an 
apt comparison since it nicely illustrates what 
Aristotle has in mind for happiness. Consider an 
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average houseplant. There is a certain set of exter-
nal factors that must be present in order for a plant 
to fl ourish. For example, it needs the right amount 
of sunlight, water, nitrogen, and carbon dioxide. 
If the plant has these elements, it will be in good 
stead to grow and thrive. Of course, having these 
conditions present will not guarantee the plant will 
fl ourish, but it certainly cannot be in a position to 
do so without them. 
Aristotle thinks of humans similarly. There 
are a variety of “external goods” which humans 
require in order to be in a position to fl ourish. He 
mentions among others things money and having 
good children, but I shall not dwell on these. Rather, 
it is the development of the internal goods—the 
virtues or excellences—that places humans in the 
best position to fl ourish. If humans in our capacity 
to desire, emote, and reason successfully acqui-
re the characteristic human excellences, in other 
words, hone our natural abilities, we will be in the 
best position to fl ourish. Happiness or living well 
amounts to human fl ourishing (Cooper, 1986). In 
the experience machine, we would not be perfec-
ting our nature through virtuous activity across 
time. The feeling of fl ourishing does not amount 
to actual fl ourishing.
Human fl ourishing and the activity 
of putting one’s life to work
Aristotle’s interests lean more towards the ethi-
cal, but there are obvious important conclusions 
regarding the meaningfulness of life to draw from 
his thoughts on happiness and human excellence. 
Surely Aristotle’s contention that fl ourishing a-
cross a lifetime is something desirable and worth 
pursuing for its own sake is intuitively reasonable. 
Humans naturally desire to fl ourish, though we 
may not always be aware of this particular desire. 
In this section, I shall explore one way we might 
adopt this notion of happiness along with the as-
sociated fundamental assumptions about human 
nature to construct an account of what makes life 
meaningful. 
At the center of Aristotle’s notion of happiness 
is activity, and fl ourishing is the best activity a-
cross time. One can see how meaningfulness emer-
ges from this activity by conceiving of one’s life as 
something to be employed, put to work, so to speak, 
engaged, lived. Consider, for example, how things 
in your everyday life take on signifi cance. Think 
about the tools in an average household toolbox. 
There is probably a wrench, a hammer, a screw-
driver, maybe a chisel, electrical tape, etc., and 
if it is like my toolbox, there is a giant plumber’s 
wrench rusting away at the bottom next to an odd 
assortment of washers, screws, nails, and dirt clods. 
Now suppose you have reached into the tool box 
a number of times for the hammer or screwdriver 
to fi x something simple or hang a picture, but you 
have never delved into the bottom of the box—you 
don’t need to: what use do you have for a plumber’s 
wrench? In this respect, the plumber’s wrench has 
no signifi cance for you. The wrench is no different 
in that regard than the dirt clods; it simply exists 
as an object occupying space in your toolbox. But 
then one day the bathroom sink springs a leak and 
you need a tool to fi x it. You think to yourself, “Ah! 
I have a plumber’s wrench.” At that point, when 
you reach for the wrench and you subsequently 
engage in the activity of fi xing the sink, the wrench 
and the activity of repair take on signifi cance for 
you, a sort of meaningfulness: it is the tool you are 
using and the activity you engage in to fi x your sink. 
The tool and activity becomes meaningful through 
engagement. 
Our position in the world can be just as in-
signifi cant and meaningless as dirt clods or the 
plumber’s wrench in my tool box, but that is not 
such a depressing thought if we realize that it is 
possible to employ our lives, analogously to the 
way we employ a tool to accomplish some task or 
engage in a particular activity, and by doing so we 
bring our lives out of an undifferentiated state. A 
human’s life need not be empty, insignifi cant, and 
meaningless.
Our lives are full of examples where the meanin-
gfulness of an activity depends upon an individual’s 
appropriating it as her own by taking an active in-
terest in it, by throwing herself into the activity and 
making something of it, doing it well. For example, 
some students fi nd it diffi cult to make it through 
college because they never fully engage in the acti-
vity of being a college student. They fail to take the 
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special sort of interest that directly involves them 
in the college experience, and so being a college 
student never quite becomes truly meaningful for 
them—it is no more and no less than another event 
in their lives, no different from simply passing time. 
Others develop an interest in the activity of learning 
and throw themselves into collegiate life. Those 
who graduate from college having sufficiently 
challenged themselves are typically the same ones 
who fi nd the college experience to be completely 
meaningful. 
In this respect, the so-called life challenges that 
have such a profound intellectual and emotional 
effect on us are similar to physical challenges. 
Without some sort of physical activity, the body 
gradually fades into its least common denominator; 
it becomes less than it can be. With increased effort 
under favorable conditions, the body maintains so-
me degree of physical health. Of course everyone’s 
optimal body performance is set differently accor-
ding to genetic variations: ten miles of jogging may 
be optimal for some, while a slow walk down the 
block and back the best for others. However, wi-
thout any activity none of the physical possibilities 
are realizable. 
The same point holds true of life challenges. 
Without engaging the various components of our 
nature we let ourselves slip into a sort of undiffe-
rentiated object-hood, but by engaging the various 
components of our nature we can maintain what it 
is that makes us fully human. As with the plumber’s 
wrench, we bring signifi cance into existence by 
putting our lives to work. Recall the range of ca-
pacities available to humans. Humans have the 
capacity to sense, feel, think, reason, cognize, re-
fl ect, introspect, love, etc., and we have the ability 
to recognize those things that individually interest 
us. Those capacities are the foundation of our lives. 
Meaningfulness emerges not just from activity but 
from activity constituted by engaging the various 
components of our nature and, as Aristotle sug-
gests, seeking the excellent expression of such ac-
tivity. A meaningful life emerges from challenging 
ourselves to develop our various capacities and fi nd 
their limits; in doing so, we express our nature to 
its fullest extent and place ourselves in the best 
possible position to fl ourish. As we fl ourish, life 
emerges as meaningful in the sense that we are em-
ploying our nature; the more enhanced and varied 
the activity, the greater degree of meaningfulness. 
Humans can learn to read, write, converse, laugh, 
argue, create, play, learn, love, and so on. So why 
not at least attempt to bring those possibilities into 
their fullest actuality? Make reading one’s own by 
reading some interesting books, writing one’s own 
by trying one’s hand at creative writing, etc. The list 
of possibilities is obviously extensive, and certainly 
no one can attempt everything—after all, there is 
only so much time in life and, more importantly, all 
the intellectual and psychological “volume knobs” 
which evolution has provided us are set differently 
according to particular genetic and socio-cultural 
factors (Wright, 1994). We all have various talents 
and distinctive abilities, and so an obvious prac-
tical entry into a fully meaningful life would be 
to recognize these abilities and pursue them, but 
this need not preclude anyone from trying some-
thing for which he may not have as great a talent 
as another. The point is that many people—at least 
those who do not face starvation or various other 
hardships—can certainly experience more than 
they do more intensely and thereby become more 
than they are.
Meaningfulness, then, cannot emerge about 
without activity, and the most meaningful activity 
is that of fl ourishing over a lifetime. Flourishing 
means living well, living robustly, and this pheno-
menon entails engaging the various intellectual, 
psychological, and physical components of our 
nature; these components become signifi cant to us 
through their employment. And so the path to me-
aningfulness in life involves recognizing the facts 
about ourselves and taking an interest in our lives 
by engaging them. Even in the best of all circums-
tances, the comatose do not live meaningful lives.
Choice and authenticity: The wisdom 
of the existentialists
The idea that life becomes meaningful through 
living well or fl ourishing suggests that we have a 
choice in the matter. Viewed objectively a person’s 
life might seem to embody the sort of meanin-
gfulness I have outlined above, yet it still would 
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remain insignifi cant for the person living that life 
unless the person had chosen the various activities 
and thereby made them his or her own. The au-
thenticity involved in making deliberate choices 
and taking responsibility for them is necessary for 
the possibility of life emerging as meaningful for 
an individual. 
Aristotle claims that virtue or excellence is 
a “state that decides,” and only those who make 
voluntary choices are people we consider respon-
sible for their actions and thereby subject to praise 
or blame. Aristotle stops short of saying much if 
anything about the freedom and authenticity of 
choice. However, various existentialists of the 
20th Century have had a great deal to say about 
freedom and its relationship to authenticity and 
responsibility.
Consider. Plants of course cannot make choices 
about how much sun they receive or when they 
get watered—it is not part of their nature to make 
choices. Plants fail to have thoughts about an-
ything, so nothing can matter to them; they simply 
respond to their environments. On the other hand, 
it is part of the nature of humans to makes choices 
and decisions in response to our environments. The 
human sensory capacity stimulates our desires and 
aversions, and we have the innate ability to refl ect 
on those desires, to weigh the pros and cons of ful-
fi lling them. We can deliberate about how to satisfy 
the desires we deem worthy. We have hopes and 
anticipations, we rationalize and conceptualize. 
And we make choices accordingly. All these abili-
ties are part of our nature. I can choose to read the 
Sunday paper rather than work in the garden; I can 
choose to go to the movies rather than painting the 
bedroom. Notice however that in either case the 
condition of my being in the position to make a 
choice is that I have the freedom to choose. 
Freedom or free will is fundamental to the hu-
man experience. Without freedom we could never 
hold others morally responsible for their actions nor 
be held responsible for our own. In the absence of 
free will, all our actions are subject to some sort 
of determination beyond our control. Indeed if 
humans were not free it would seem to render the 
present discussion about the meaningfulness of life 
pointless—after all, machines, plants, and animals 
other than ourselves, all of which lack free will, do 
not live meaningful lives. 
Although the thought that humans lack freedom 
may sound implausible given the implicit way we 
conceive of ourselves acting, there are a number 
of persuasive, contemporary arguments for such a 
view. If one were to accept, say, a behaviorist mo-
del of human development and action, one would 
be committed to the view that all human actions are 
conditioned and thereby determined by one’s natu-
ral and social environment (Skinner, 1971/2001). 
The behaviorist explanation of my becoming a phi-
losophy professor might include the fact that there 
were a certain set of behavioral reinforcements 
along my educational path which shaped and the-
reby determined my “choice” among professions. 
A hard-line behaviorist would simply deny that I 
could ever have chosen otherwise. A behaviorist 
must reject the existence of anything like freedom 
of action. And of course the notion of authenticity 
subsequently evaporates with our freedom. 
A rather different line of thought which seems 
to be committed to denying the existence of free 
will, too, is the functionalist theory of mind. 
As discussed in section 2, the functionalist claims 
that all mental events such as thoughts, beliefs, ho-
pes, etc. are actually brain events. My thought that 
I am sitting in Texas on a hot summer day amount 
to a series of neural events in my brain fed by the 
physiology of my present sensory state, and since 
all neural electro-chemical processes are physical 
processes and thereby subject to causal laws, any 
particular brain state must have a suffi cient expla-
natory cause that determines it. My brain events are 
really not much different in this regard than other 
events occurring in the physical world. When I 
am playing billiards and the cue stick successfully 
impacts the cue ball impelling it into the eight ball, 
which rolls across the table in a certain direction 
causing it to drop into the corner pocket, what I 
have just experienced is a set of causal relations 
leading to the ultimate effect of the eight ball res-
ting in the corner pocket. If brain states are subject 
to the same causal laws as billiards balls, neural 
events have other neural events that cause them to 
occur, and those neural events have others, and so 
forth until we reach the level of sensory input and 
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make the causal leap to external causal factors. But 
nowhere in that series is there an “uncaused cause” 
which manifests itself as the freedom to choose 
otherwise in the course of events. So, in the end the 
functionalist faces an equally signifi cant challenge 
to the existence of free will. 
The jury is still out on the problem of free will, 
but the issue obviously remains philosophically 
interesting and important. However, if we are to 
accept the possibility of moral obligation and me-
aningfulness, we must continue to conceive of 
ourselves as having some ability to act freely in 
at least some cases, since without a conception 
of human freedom, the many ways we describe 
and interpret ourselves in our everyday “goings 
about in the world” would make very little sense. 
If I ask you why you met a friend for lunch rather 
than showing up for your scheduled meeting with 
me, and you respond with all honesty and sincerity 
that you decided to skip our appointment and meet 
your friend because she hasn’t been feeling well, 
you are speaking with the implicit understanding 
that you had a choice in the matter. And none of 
what you say to me would make any sense if I 
didn’t at least assume that you were free to make 
the choice. When you chose, you didn’t mean that 
neuron 259x fi red which caused neuron 25550n to 
fi re, and so forth. What you meant is simply that you 
chose to do otherwise than you could have done, and 
you hopefully take responsibility for doing it. We 
presuppose in our everyday conversations that at 
least some of our actions are free, and for this reason 
alone, it is crucial to retain the notion of freedom. 
Freedom, authenticity, and responsibility are at 
the core of Jean-Paul Sartre’s (2001) existentialism. 
Sartre denies the existence of anything like human 
nature, and he is equally uncomfortable with any 
metaphysical notion of free will. Nevertheless, 
human passion, reason, and freedom play a pivotal 
role in his philosophy. Sartre claims that humans 
are radically free. We are free because there is no 
god to have established some particular nature and 
plan for us. We are “abandoned” in the world with 
nothing but our freedom. As he famously declares 
in his essay Existentialism and humanism, “We 
are left alone, without excuse. That is what I mean 
when I say that man is condemned to be free” 
(Sartre, 2001, p. 24). At every turn in life humans 
are faced with a choice. These choices range from 
the more mundane, like whether to wear gray or 
green socks, to the more signifi cant sorts of “life 
choices” all humans make, like whether to go to co-
llege or join the military, whether to marry a loved 
one or reject him in favor of a career, whether to 
continue living in the face of a debilitating disease. 
And Sartre claims that we must choose; even cho-
osing not to choose is nevertheless a choice. Indeed 
the realization that we are “alone” in the world, 
free, and without excuse creates terrifi c anxiety.
How we approach this freedom is perhaps the 
fundamental question for Sartre. The possibility of 
living a meaningful life is predicated by our ability 
to make deliberate choices and take responsibility 
for them. Sartre (2001) claims, 
If man as the existentialist defi nes him is not defi nable, 
it is because to begin with he is nothing. He will not be 
anything until later, and then he will be what he makes 
of himself. […] man is nothing else but that which he 
makes of himself. […] When we say that man chooses 
himself, we do mean that every one of us must choose 
himself; but by that we also mean that in choosing for 
himself he chooses for all men. For in effect, of all the 
actions a man may take in order to create himself as he 
wills to be, there is not one which is not creative, at the 
same time, of an image of man such as he believes he 
ought to be. […] I am thus responsible for myself and 
for all men […] (Sartre, 2001, pp. 26-28). 
When I choose to live, say, the life of a mono-
gamous companion or a diligent employee or a 
“downwardly mobile” slacker (Slacker, 1991), not 
only am I thereby responsible for myself having 
made this choice and the consequences resulting 
from it, but I am creating an image of humani-
ty as I would wish it to be. Sartre thus unders-
tands responsibility as having an added dimension 
which weighs heavily on us, yet our ability to fess 
up to this fact raises the value of authenticity: 
recognizing that one makes oneself what one is 
and what one would want humanity to be like 
through the power of choosing, subsequently ma-
king a deliberate choice, and taking responsibility 
for it. 
Rev Avances Psicologia_julio_28.indd   39 7/31/08   4:48:08 PM
?Blake E. Hestir
 40?Avances en Psicología Latinoamericana/Bogotá (Colombia)/Vol. 26(1)/pp. 30-42/2008/ISSN1794-4724 
Instances when we excuse ourselves for our 
actions or fi nd ourselves doing what other people 
tell us to do and acting as if we had no choice in 
the matter, or times when we refuse to recognize 
something about ourselves and choose for our-
selves a “living lie” are all cases of what Sartre 
(2001) refers to as “bad faith.” Suppose one of 
your friends were to complain that she became an 
accountant because her parents, who were paying 
her college tuition, told her she must study some-
thing practical. So, having received her college de-
gree in accounting, she resorted to fi nding the only 
type of job that matched her degree. She says her 
parents made it impossible for her to do anything 
else. According to Sartre, your friend would have 
fallen into bad faith in the sense that she is den-
ying that she really had a choice in the matter. But, 
she certainly could have chosen to do something 
else if she didn’t like accounting. Of course, the 
choice of a career in which she had no formal trai-
ning may have made entry into the job market con-
siderably more diffi cult, but, after all, life is full of 
diffi cult choices—that is what makes authenticity 
shine all the more brightly. 
Consider a slightly different case of bad faith. 
Suppose I were to decide that in addition to my ca-
reer as a philosophy professor I wanted to become 
the fi rst professor to play professional basketball. 
Unfortunately, given my physical stature and subs-
tantive lack of physical dexterity, the fact is that 
I will never be able to play professionally even 
though I continue to tell myself that I can. Insofar 
as I lie to myself, I am acting in bad faith. 
There are obviously many different ways people 
regularly live in bad faith, but those of us who 
spend our time living this way are taking time away 
from living a truly meaningful life; living a lie or 
living someone else’s conception of a meaningful 
life is not making the activity of living meanin-
gful for you. The challenge is to live an authentic 
life. For Sartre (2001), living authentically means 
realizing one’s existential predicament, making 
deliberate choices, being truthful to oneself, and 
above all taking responsibility for one’s actions. We 
construct who we are through these choices and the 
subsequent choices we make about how to comport 
ourselves towards the consequences, whether or not 
these consequences manifest themselves as those 
we initially anticipated or desired.
One point that both Sartre and the German 
existentialist Martin Heidegger (1962) recognize 
as a source of inauthenticity is the human tendency 
to fall in step with what other people do. Sartre’s 
primary focus is on freedom and responsibility; 
Heidegger’s remarks on inauthenticity arise from 
his conception of the basic temporality of the hu-
man predicament, within which arises the challenge 
to make one’s activities one’s own. He claims that 
this primordial condition of humans, or what he 
rather awkwardly calls the “Being-in-the-world of 
Dasein,” is care, and by this he means that humans 
are beings who care about what they are Life mat-
ters to us (Heidegger, 1962). 
Human life at this primordial level is like an 
event and as such it has a temporal structure. The li-
ving activity is directed towards the future, the next 
moment, the next week, the next year, ultimately 
towards death. And so, in our “going about” being 
humans, we are always, as Heidegger (1962) says, 
“ahead of ourselves.” But we are also “thrown” 
into a world that has a particular socio-cultural and 
historical dimension. Each of us carries a history 
infl uenced by our cultural heritage. Someone born 
into a Catholic, Hindu, Islamic, Jewish, or Protes-
tant cultural context—whether or not that person 
accepts the particular religious doctrines—will ca-
rry bits of those values and perspectives with him. 
Finally, humans are always presently engaged in 
activity and are “with” other humans whether we 
are at work or home alone. Who I am and what I 
do make sense within the present socio-cultural set-
ting. Whether I am teaching or working at home in 
my study, being a philosophy professor only makes 
sense within the context of a university system with 
students who are interested in learning philoso-
phy and colleagues here and at other schools who 
practice philosophy and perhaps read my work and 
with whom I engage in philosophical discussion. 
When I am fully engaged in this activity, being a 
philosopher or teacher is completely transparent 
yet cognitively invisible to me. I am conscious of 
it and understand it in the sense that I am doing it, 
not necessarily in the sense that I can defi ne it and 
refl ect on it. 
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Humans let themselves “fall” into the activity 
of being whatever they are, whether a professor, 
carpenter, doctor, politician, friend, lover, or pa-
rent. The problem though is that falling too far in 
step with what people do as professors or lovers 
or whatnot moves us away from that mode of life 
which brings a human into a meaningful existence, 
i.e., that existence where I face up to what I am and 
what I can do. Falling too far can lead to inauthen-
ticity in the sense that what I do slips from being 
“mine” and becomes a factor of other people. Su-
ppose deep inside I really detest being a professor, 
but I let myself continue with the professorial life 
and spend my days going about being the professor 
people expect me to be—in other words, just doing 
“what one does.” Eventually through routine and 
habit the nagging thought that I don’t enjoy my 
job fades into the background of my daily activity. 
In fact, as I go about comporting myself “profes-
sorily,” I seem to be perfectly happy. The problem 
as Heidegger (1962) sees it is that I am living an 
inauthentic life in the sense that I have not really 
made the professorial life my own; it is some other 
mode of life that I have adopted and with which I 
have slowly fallen in step. And so in the end, both 
Sartre (2001) and Heidegger (1962) come to re-
cognize in their different ways the signifi cance of 
authenticity in a meaningful life.
Conclusion: Making the choice to live well
Happiness and authenticity, as I have characteri-
zed them in this paper, are interrelated conditions 
for the possibility of a life emerging as meaningful 
for an individual. Humans must engage our lives 
through the deliberate choice to live well, through 
the choice to live actively and robustly. When I 
choose to pursue some activity, engage in it with 
verve and vigor, and take responsibility for doing 
so, the activity emerges as something substantively 
signifi cant and meaningful for me. The constant 
affi rmation of one’s life choices or, in other words, 
the choice to continue with various life activities 
that contribute to our living well grounds the step 
into a meaningful life. Humans are centers of sen-
suous, creative, emotional, intellectual activity 
expressing a past in the present through choice, 
motivated by desire for happiness, i.e., the best acti-
vity. From this perspective, the meaningful life will 
perpetually be threatened by either (a) ignorance or 
the lack of knowledge concerning the best course 
of action; (b) laziness, escapism through, say, some 
addiction, or some degree of passivity, whether that 
amounts to following along with other people or 
simply not engaging one’s life at all; or (c) fear, the 
inability to make the choice to live well. Ignorance, 
laziness, and fear (this need not be an exhaustive 
list) compromise our lives and reduce our ability 
to fl ourish and choose among possibilities; they 
detract from the possibility of choosing to live a 
meaningful life. 
So, at the end of the day, when the long afternoon 
light fades from windows and darkness envelopes 
all, I imagine the playful philosopher Nietzsche 
slipping into our loneliest of lonely moments and 
whispering in our ears, “This life of yours with all 
its pains and joys and thoughts and sighs, these trees 
and this moonlight and this spider and I myself: Is 
this the sort of life you would will to live over and 
over, innumerably many times?” (Nietzsche, 1974, 
p. 341). I hope my few philosophical ruminations on 
the human condition and choosing to live well have 
offered a way of discovering an enlightened opti-
mism in response to this heaviest of all weights. 
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